On May 27 Farzana Parveen was beaten to death in broad daylight as she was about to enter the gate of the heavily guarded Lahore High Court. She had come to challenge a case of abduction filed by her father against her husband. Her father and brothers batter her with bricks and police and security personnel posted near the court failed to intervene before it was too late.
Under Sudan’s Criminal Act (1991), rape is defined as zina (adultery and fornication) without consent. This constitutes a serious legal obstacle for rape victims in the country.
Hudud (singular, hadd, meaning limit, restriction, or prohibition) are regarded as the ordinances of Allah, and they have fixed punishments derived from Islam. Among the offenses for which hudud penalties are prescribed is zina which is defined as sexual intercourse between a man and woman outside a valid marriage contract and must be proved by confession before the court, the testimony of four adult men, and pregnancy if the woman is unmarried. The punishment is stoning to death for married offenders and 100 lashes for unmarried offenders. Continue reading
Sudanese women activists do not use United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325 to claim rights. During my eight years of engagement with women’s activist from diverse backgrounds in the country I have hardly heard the resolution mentioned, except in the context of the Darfur conflict. It is understood narrowly by local actors to pertain to protection against gender-based violence, specifically sexual violence. In a Sudanese context, where the sitting president is facing an arrest order from the International Criminal Court for the systematic use of sexual violence in the Darfur conflict, needless to say the resolution is politicised and considered too “sensitive” to be dealt with. Nine years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Africa’s longest running civil war, no national strategy exists in Sudan to implement Resolution 1325, because “there is no political will” to do so.
This post is based on an expert analysis published by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
Hopes were high that the uprisings that began in 2011 across the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) would bring not just democratization, but greater gender equality. Rather than safeguarding women’s equal rights, these revolutions have so far reinforced patriarchy in many states rocked by the uprisings. But Arab women are fighting back.
There are rumblings of discontent within the Sudanese state; among those critical voices are Islamist women. They want an end to child marriages. 37% of girls in Sudan were married before they reached 18, showed a 2006 health survey. 12,5% were married before they celebrated their 15th birthday. Islamist women demand a legal reform of the Muslim Family Law.
With the Islamist coup d’etat in 1989, Sudanese women assumed a central place in the Islamic national building project, a project which in some areas opened up new possibilities for women and in others severely restricted them. Women are now in majority at the country’s universities. A 25% gender quota in the national and local legislative assemblies are put in place by this government and in the 2010 elections a woman ran as a candidate for the Presidency for the first time in Sudanese history. Yet, the Islamist takeover also took away important rights. For example, in 1991, the regime codified the Muslim Family Law. The 1991 family law, which regulates women’s rights within marriage, custody, divorce and inheritance, has emerged as a contested piece of legislation; among the debated elements are child marriages. According to the 1991 law, a judge can affirm a marriage for a girl who shows signs of puberty, often interpreted as the age of 10. The 1991 law revoked a judicial circular stating that the legal age of marriage age is18.
On 14 June, the next presidential election will take place in Iran. Last time in 2009 the election lead to huge demonstrations, and since then the country has gradually moved further into a crisis of legitimacy over the future of the Islamic Republic. So what are the big issues at stake this time around?
The Islamic Republic of Iran is currently caught in conflict-ridden times. The country is facing international sanctions and war threats due to its nuclear programme, not to forget the high inflation and economic crisis that create hardship for the people. Moreover, Iran is also dealing with an internal power struggle over who holds the best solution for the future of the Republic. The conflict is not only played out between the state and the opposition, but also within the state. On the one hand, the current president Ahmadinejad has served his second and final term of presidency, but is still very eager to name his follower. The Supreme Leader Khamenei, on the other hand, is fed up with having an uncontainable president and is likely to cement his solitary authority once and for all. In October last year, he even introduced the idea of implementing a radical constitutional amendment to eliminate the position of the president altogether, saying: “If deemed appropriate, Iran could do without a president”.
The big political topics concerning international relations and internal power struggles are likely to overshadow the presidential campaign. Concurrently, the political opposition is severely weakened. The opposition suffers a lack of leadership as Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, the leaders of the Green Movement (Jonbesh-e sabz), have been kept in house arrest since 2011. Moreover, a range of activists has been put under surveillance, arrested, and forced into exile over the last couple of years. As a result, the election is likely to stand between different conservative candidates with affiliation to either Khamenei or Ahmadinejad. Still, which candidates will pass the vetting of the Guardian Council remains unknown for the time being.